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The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) defense nuclear facilities[1] are
responsible for producing and maintaining the U.S.' nuclear weapons
arsenal. Spread at dispersed locations across the U.S and developed
over the five decades since World War II, these facilities have contributed
to the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal's successful deterrence of nuclear
attacks against the U.S. and have also promoted scientific research in areas
besides nuclear weapons research. Responsibility for nuclear weapons work
at these facilities is divided into four categories:
A. Weapons research and development at New Mexico's Los Alamos
and Sandia National Laboratories and California's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;
B. Nuclear materials production and processing (plutonium and
tritium) at Washington's Hanford Plant and South Carolina's Savannah
River site and uranium processing at Ohio's Feed Materials Production Center and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory;
C. Warhead component production at Colorado's Rocky Flats Plant,
Tennessee's Y-12 Plant, Ohio's Mound Plant, Florida's Pinellas
Plant, Missouri's Kansas City Plant, and Texas' Pantex Plant
where final assembly occurs; and
(1)

(2)
D. Warhead testing at the Nevada Test Site.[2]
Besides nuclear weapons research, DOE laboratories also conduct
scientific research in areas such as biomedicine, high-performance
computing, and environmental restoration which benefit from normal
scientific exchange between Americans and foreign scientists. The 33 DOE
labs have 56,000 employees, an annual budget of approximately $6.5 billion,
and had received 63 Nobel prizes as of late 1997. Such scientific interaction has seen a steady increase in the number of foreign nationals visiting
DOE labs from 3,800 per year in 1988 to approximately 7,000 a decade
later.[3]
This influx of foreign visitors and employees at DOE labs is a
natural outgrowth of scientific research's global nature. It's
statutory authorization derives from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
which called for international cooperation in developing peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. Additional provisions of this act provide
for classifying and controlling weapons information and a prohibition
against disseminating such information to foreign countries without
presidential authorization.[4]
This international cooperation has undoubtedly produced scientific
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benefits and facilitated international cooperation as provided for by the
authorizing statute. Unfortunately, the agencies and facilities executing
this statute's requirements have been less attentive to and successful in
fulfilling their statutory requirements to protect the security of this
information from unauthorized users.
Concern over DOE nuclear weapons information security dates back at
least two decades. It has built steadily since then, culminating in a
crescendo of reports during 1999 documenting grievous security lapses and
the hemorrhaging of crucial national security information from DOE
labs to potentially hostile foreign governments. An early expression of
concern over possible security problems involving foreign visitors at
DOE labs was expressed in an April 1979 General Accounting Office
(GAO) report. This report warned that it was impossible to estimate the
role played by U.S. nuclear training of foreign scientists in spreading
nuclear proliferation and that there was no way to determine the true
intentions of foreign nationals trained in the U.S. or the motivations
of their countries in having them receive such training.[5]
Recommendations made in this report to enhance nuclear weapons
information security included considering discontinuing distribution
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of government publications capable of providing substantial assistance
to anyone seeking a nuclear weapons capability, clarifying specific
data or information subject to sensitive nuclear technology export
criteria in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, and considering home country
adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty in selecting foreign nationals
to participate in and receive fellowships from U.S. Government nuclear
research programs.[6] An additional demonstration of this report's concern
with security is provided by the following admonition:
Although aliens may have an important role in advancing U.S.
nuclear research and development, the Secretary of Energy should
reassess foreign participation at Government-owned nuclear research
facilities and limit, where appropriate, participation that could be
used to significantly raise the ability of another nation to make
nuclear explosives.[7]
These security concerns would receive heightened emphasis in
another GAO report three years later. This document determined that some
DOE labs did not control sensitive items despite their susceptibility to theft,
properly identify or tag items, adequately account for items, or document
property movements or transfers. Another report finding was the practice
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of two labs of excluding items costing $500 or more from sensitive
property controls even though such items would appear to be more
vulnerable to theft.[8]
Further concern over security and long-term development at DOE labs
would be expressed as the 1980's progressed. Hearings before the House
Energy and Commerce Committee in 1987 and 1988 revealed safety
problems such as radiation releases and deficient fire protection at DOE
nuclear facilities. An equally troubling revelation of these hearings saw
DOE weapons site workers threatened with losing security clearances
or termination if they reported safety and other concerns to U.S. Government
agencies including Congress.[9] Concern over the future of DOE's nuclear
complex led Congress to require a presidential report on the future structure
of this complex in 1988 and 1989 defense authorization legislation.[10]
Congressional concern was also expressed over what it saw as the
decreasing importance of DOE's Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs
and the Defense Department (DOD) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Atomic Energy offices with both of these offices having nuclear security
responsibilities.[11]
Nearly a decade after expressing its initial concerns over the foreign
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visitors program, GAO provided further documentation of its concerns
with its October 1988 report Nuclear Nonproliferation: Major Weaknesses
in Foreign Visitor Controls at Weapons Laboratories. Findings from this
document indicate that DOE granted nearly 6,700 foreign nationals access
to its weapons laboratories between January 1986 and September 1987.
These visitors included 222 from communist countries and 675 from other
sensitive countries. From this total, GAO randomly selected and reviewed
the files for 181 communist and 637 sensitive country visitors during the
aforementioned period.[12]
GAO went on to chronicle serious foreign visitors program weaknesses.
It mentioned that DOE failed to follow its own requirements and obtain
background information on visitors from communist or sensitive countries,
its failure to use available data for prescreening visitors from foreign
facilities suspected of nuclear weapons related activities, failing to
identify and review all visits involving sensitive weapons related subjects,
not considering a number of weapons related activities as sensitive
subjects, failing to enforce various internal control requirements for
approving, monitoring, and reporting foreign visits, and the absence
of an integrated information system or reviews of the foreign visitors
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program.[13]
GAO reports continued to document DOE security problems in the
early 1990's. A 1991 report warned that DOE information systems
containing important data about security weaknesses and incidents
possessed limited analytical capabilities and unreliable information.
This predicament was compounded by DOE's failure to perform a
comprehensive assessment of its information and information technology
needs as applied to its security program. GAO asserted such assessment
was needed to ensure the coordination and focus of departmental
information resources capable of achieving DOE security goals and
sharing or transferring data.[14]
Two years later, another GAO report evaluated DOE's security clearance
program praising its personnel security clearance backlog reduction from
nearly 135,000 cases in 1988 to 1,033 cases in 1993 along with its reduction
of clearances issued from 220,000 in 1986 to 174,000 in 1992.[15]
However, GAO also criticized DOE for not focusing sufficient management
attention on preemployment screening of potential employees,
ineffective management of cases involving questionable employee
background information, and for not providing closer oversight of
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contractors preemployment investigation of prospective employees.[16]
The mid-1990's saw increased international visitation to DOE labs
with the percentage of average annual visits by foreign nationals increasing
by over 50% from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s.[17] A September 1997
GAO study showed that out of 5,472 visits to the Los Alamos, Livermore,
and Sandia Laboratories between 1994-1996, by visitors from sensitive
countries such as China, Pakistan, and Russia, background checks were
performed for only 892 or 16% of these visitors.[18]
This same study also detailed additional problems. These included
DOE's failure to follow its procedures requiring foreign visitor background checks, Los Alamos and Sandia obtaining a partial exemption
to DOE Order 1240.2B in 1994 thus essentially avoiding the background
check process, giving foreign visitors unescorted 24-hour access to
controlled area facilities, boxes marked as containing sensitive material
being left in a foreign visitor accessible hallway, classified information
being included in a newsletter sent to 11 foreign nationals, and DOE
counterintelligence programs not being based on a comprehensive threat
assessment examining the nature and extent of foreign espionage
activities.[19]

(9)
Concern over possible foreign espionage at DOE labs, as documented
by reports such as this, prompted the House of Representatives to approve
the formation of a special investigative committee on June 18, 1998 to
examine these security concerns.[20] Chaired by Rep. Chris Cox (R-CA),
the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/
Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China worked
throughout 1998 before releasing a classified version of its report in
January 1999 and an unclassified version in May 1999.[21]
Representing the first in a series of blasts against DOE security
practices, the Cox Report contained a number of serious charges within
its three volumes. It argued that Chinese espionage at DOE laboratories
dates from the late 1970s and continues to the present, that China had stolen
design information on the U.S' most advanced nuclear weapons along with
classified information on all currently deployed nuclear warheads including
the W-88 warhead on Trident submarine D-5 ballistic missiles, and design
and other classified information on neutron bomb warheads. Additional
report determinations include Chinese intelligence collection efforts
targeting Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Oak Ridge, and Sandia
laboratories, that China would exploit stolen design information in building
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its next generation of nuclear warheads, that stolen U.S. nuclear secrets
enable China's nuclear weapons capabilities to match the U.S.', facilitate the
enhancement of mobile Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
and that counterintelligence programs at DOE weapons laboratories fail to
meet even minimal standards.[22]
Select committee recommendations to repair such damages included
requiring a semiannual presidential report on Chinese espionage and
responsive and preventative steps taken by various U.S. Government
agencies to this espionage, drastically enhancing DOE's counterintelligence
capability, congressional examination of whether DOE should retain its
nuclear weapons responsibilities, and the need for intelligence community
compliance with the National Security Act and congressional insistence
on strict adherence to this statute. Additional Cox recommendations
include advocating Chinese compliance with the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), greater U.S. MTCR enforcement leadership,
giving the State Department sole satellite licensing authority, and new
legislation to improve sensitive law enforcement information sharing
within the U.S. Government's executive branch.[23]
Cox report contents ignited a political firestorm that continues to rage.

(11)
Wen-Ho Lee, a Los Alamos employee, was arrested on charges of
performing espionage for China.[24] Another assault on DOE laboratory
security came in June 1999 from the President's Council on Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). This organization advises
the President on intelligence-related issues and had been charged
by President Clinton with reviewing the adequacy of DOE laboratory
security March 18, 1999.[25]
Chaired by former Senator Warren Rudman (R-NH), PFIAB's
report also excoriated the lax security at DOE laboratories. PFIAB
determined that DOE weapons laboratories have been and remain major
targets of foreign intelligence agencies, open-source information on
these DOE facilities alone reveals their security and counterintelligence
operations receiving low priority for decades, organizational disarray,
managerial neglect, and an arrogant culture have created an espionage
scandal waiting to happen, that the subtlety and skill of Chinese intelligence
gathering methods are particularly challenging for the U.S. and its
weapons laboratories, that DOE is a dysfunctional bureaucracy incapable
of reform, that minimum qualifications for the Secretary of Energy include
national security and intelligence experience, and the need for fundamental
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change in DOE's institutional culture and attitude toward security.[26]
Rudman panel recommendations include DOE laboratories recognizing
that national nuclear stockpile and nuclear secrets protection are its foremost priorities, the need for independent oversight of weapons laboratories,
replacing the 15 congressional committees currently overseeing weapons
laboratories with a single joint committee, the CIA and FBI expanding
their activity to include the weapons facilities, and a more effective
personnel security program with clear and attainable thresholds for
suspending clearances with cause that includes pending criminal
investigations. Additional recommendations include establishing a
comprehensive weapons lab cyber-security program, developing a
comprehensive classified document control system and classification
review, and continuing the foreign visitors program but ensuring tighter
security standards such as clear demarcation between secure and
open areas at labs and firm guidelines for weapons lab employee contacts
with foreign visitors from sensitive countries.[27]
DOE did not remain oblivious to these security concerns. It's
Office of Safeguards and Security issued a report in 1999 that gave
marginal or unsatisfactory security ratings to Los Alamos, Sandia,
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Lawrence Livermore, Oak Ridge's Y-12 plant, and Rocky Flats
in areas such as protection program operations, information security,
nuclear materials control and accountability, and personnel security.[28]
A more official policy statement from DOE came with a July 14, 1999
memorandum from Energy Secretary Bill Richardson. This document
listed new policies and procedures for DOE to follow in regards to
unclassified visits and assignments by foreign nationals at DOE facilities.
Richardson's memorandum rescinded DOE order 1240.2B along with
its foreign visitor exemptions and waivers. The new directive N 142.1
establishes the Energy Secretary's authority as the sole official responsible
for approving visits and assignments for foreign nationals from countries
the State Department identifies as terrorist nations, requiring security plans
for all unclassified foreign visits and assignments to secure areas at DOE
facilities, delegating approval authority for foreign visits and assignments
to DOE or contractor site managers, and requiring the involvement of local
counterintelligence, security, and export control officials in the foreign visit
approval process.[29]
These DOE efforts, though, could not diminish the consequences of
its victimization by foreign espionage activities or its enormous failure to
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prevent such activity despite two decades worth of reports documenting
DOE's manifold security vulnerabilities. This failure to provide an effective
response to long-term and growing foreign intelligence efforts to
acquire sensitive technologies with national security applications[30]
produced increasing congressional criticism of an already embattled agency
and prompted the introduction of legislation to overhaul U.S. nuclear
weapons management during the summer of 1999.
Concern over the foreign visitors program reached congressional radar
screens before issuance of the unclassified Cox and PFIAB reports. On
March 25, 1999, Rep. Jim Ryun (R-KS) introduced H.R. 1348 whose
provisions included establishing a moratorium on the foreign visitors
program and requiring the creation of counterintelligence programs at
DOE laboratories.[31] Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL), the chair of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, introduced a companion version of
Ryun's bill on April 27, 1999.[32]
Various congressional committees conducted hearings on Cox and
Rudman report findings during the summer of 1999 in an effort to obtain
additional information on DOE security breakdowns and seek possible
legislative remedies to these including the possible creation of a new
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agency to oversee DOE nuclear facilities. During a July 13, 1999 House
Commerce Committee hearing on this issue, Rep. Heather Wilson (R-NM),
whose district includes the Sandia National Laboratory, observed that
despite the voluminous literature on DOE lab security problems little
fundamental security improvement had been achieved and that it was
necessary for DOE and Congress to try more radical reforms.[33]
Wilson went on to assert that three principles must guide any DOE
nuclear security reform proposals:
1. Any legislation must strengthen management lines of authority
and accountability, not just move boxes around on an organizational chart. This must be about changing the way that our nuclear programs are managed and strengthening the authority of
those in a clearly defined chain of command.
2. Our multi-program laboratories must continue to be able to do
work on a wide range of subjects for many customers. Fully one
third of the work conducted at our national laboratories is not
for the nuclear weapons program....
3. The independent agency within the DOE must have necessary
support and staff functions within it to operate independently....[34]
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Another important hearing was conducted by the House Government
Reform Committee on June 24, 1999. This hearing examined whether
advocates of stricter security controls at DOE and the Defense Department
received personnel sanctions for favoring enhanced security measures.
Edward McCallum, the Director of DOE's Office of Safeguards and
Security testified that several DOE security officers responded to former
Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary's 1994 call to report security deficiencies
without fear of reprisal only to suffer disciplinary sanctions afterwards.
McCallum also maintained that a long-serving DOE Security Director
retired in 1999 after attempting to take action against an employee who
violated security procedures and admitted a Russian visitor with an
uncleared laptop computer into a secure area at the Savannah River
site despite being warned against this by the Security Office.[35]
Another witness, Peter Leitner of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, testified that he received poor performance evaluations and
financial penalties for his work denying export license applications
originating with DOE laboratories which he believed would transfer
equipment with nuclear weapons application to Russia. Such sanctions
were also applied against Leitner for his reports that were critical of

(17)
Chinese efforts to obtain U.S. nuclear technology which he contended
were facilitated by the liberalization of U.S. export controls on sensitive
technologies.[36]
Legislation introduced by Ryun and Shelby, testimony from the
aforementioned and other hearings, Cox and Rudman Report findings,
the Thompson-Lieberman investigation, and congressional displeasure
at Clinton Administration national security policy and DOE's past
security performance, contributed to a significant revamping of DOE
nuclear facilities within the 2000 defense authorization bill. The
conference committee report for this legislation was published on
August 6, 1999.
This document proposed the creation of a new agency within DOE to
address these long-standing security deficiencies. Referring to DOE's welldocumented security problems, conferees proposed the following treatment:
To correct these systemic problems, the conferees agree to establish
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the Department that would be responsible for
nuclear weapons development, naval nuclear propulsion, defense
nuclear nonproliferation, and fissile material disposition; establish
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security, counterintelligence, and intelligence offices; and prescribe
personnel, budgeting, and other management practices for the
NNSA.[37]
Congress also endowed the NNSA with numerous institutional
characteristics. The agency would be part of DOE and headed by
an Under Secretary for Nuclear Security appointed by the President
and subject to Senate confirmation. The Secretary of Energy would
be responsible for developing and promoting departmental security,
intelligence, and counterintelligence policies and establish DOE
counterintelligence and intelligence offices. NNSA's mission would be
enhancing national security through military application of nuclear
energy and reducing global danger from mass destruction weapons.[38]
Additional congressional mandates for NNSA include its administrator
establishing policies and procedures to ensure maximum protection for
classified information in its possession, the counterintelligence and
intelligence offices being headed by a senior Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executive with counterintelligence experience, and a requirement that this official submit an annual report to the Energy Secretary,
Director of Central Intelligence, FBI Director, and congressional defense
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committees on the effectiveness of DOE facilities counterintelligence
efforts in classified and unclassified versions. Other stipulations
include NNSA establishment of procedures prohibiting individuals
without security clearances from having unescorted access to any
classified area or access to classified information, users of NNSA
computers having no privacy expectations in their use of government
computers, and administration submission of annual reports to congressional defense committees on special access programs with
such reports containing budgetary and discussion information on these
programs along with justification for designating such programs as
special access.[39]
This legislation became law on October 5, 1999 when President Clinton
signed the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization Act. In signing the
legislation, though, Clinton expressed strong concerns about provisions
dealing with NNSA including what he asserted was congress' intent to
isolate NNSA personnel and contractors from outside direction, limit the
Secretary of Energy's ability to appoint subordinates to direct NNSA
activities, and concerns dealing with U.S. policy toward China.[40]
Congressional implementation of this statute began the same day

(20)
when House Armed Services Committee Chair Rep. Floyd Spence (R-SC)
announced the appointment of an oversight panel chaired by Rep. Mac
Thornberry (R-TX) on DOE reorganization. This panel was charged with
working with Secretary Richardson to ensure that DOE security reforms
contained in the defense authorization legislation were carried out.[41]
The goals of DOE's Foreign Visitors Program in promoting international
scientific research and cooperation are laudable. Evidence of the program's
success in these objectives are the numerous Nobel Prizes awarded to DOE
lab personnel and the opportunity it has provided for numerous foreign
nationals to enhance their scientific expertise for their own professional
benefit and the advancement of scientific research in their countries.
Unfortunately for the U.S. and its national security interests, this
openness and the desire to promote enhanced international understanding
of nuclear science, created a climate in which security over militarily
sensitive material was effectively ignored by DOE personnel, by DOE
predecessor agencies personnel, and postwar presidential administrations.
This lackadaisical approach to security was exploited by individuals from
nations such as China that do not share the U.S.' lofty ideals of free and open
interchange of ideas and research.
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Without access to classified Chinese, foreign, or U.S. intelligence
assessments of the value of stolen U.S. nuclear secrets, estimating the
exact impact and cost of this espionage on U.S. national security is impossible. Cox report findings about the loss of these secrets in the area of
Chinese nuclear warhead technology acquisition alone are alarming.
The creation of the NNSA and other reforms contained in the just-passed
defense authorization legislation need time for implementation, regular and
effective congressional oversight, and funding to determine their efficacy.
Ongoing cooperation between Congress and present and future presidential
administrations is also required if U.S. nuclear information security is to be
enhanced. Rep. Wilson's advocacy of the need for strengthened DOE
management accountability on security issues is of particular importance in
future policy developments concerning DOE lab security.
The foreign visitors program should continue but with much tougher
security oversight and the swift imposition of stringent criminal penalties
for violations committed by DOE personnel or foreign visitors. The
program should also restrict access to sensitive information and work areas
to cleared visitors from countries with which the U.S. has a formal military
alliance. Most importantly, it is imperative that DOE lab employees and
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contractors inculcate an attitude in which protecting sensitive information
becomes of paramount importance even if it is at the expense of the
ideal of enhancing international scientific information exchange. Congress
should also examine the feasibility of establishing a direct link between lab
funding and lab performance on security and counterintelligence performance.
DOE's foreign visitors program illustrates the consequences of ignoring
the security issues involved in working with vital national security
information. Such inattention to security has already proven costly to U.S.
national security although the full cost can not be determined without
access to classified U.S. and foreign intelligence assessments or knowledge
of the results of future national security crises involving the U.S.
Revelation of foreign espionage at DOE labs reminds us that the U.S.
remains vulnerable to a variety of national security threats and that not all
individuals and nations share the U.S.' often idyllic goals about the free and
open exchange of scientific and other information.
The saga of espionage at DOE labs should also give pause to those
advocating the immediate and wholesale declassification of voluminous
quantities of U.S. Government information without recognizing the reality
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that there are individuals, organizations, and nations who will attempt to use
such information to threaten U.S. national security interests, the physical
security of Americans, and the security of people from nations allied with
the U.S. Sober acceptance of this reality should be incumbent on all of us
working with government information and desirous of enhancing public
access to such resources.
It should also foster a professional and ethical commitment by depository
librarians to strive for a more pragmatic and accountable approach to government information access. This approach acknowledges the desirability
of complete and uncensored access to government information while recognizing the serious intellectual and moral consequences of unauthorized individuals and groups gaining access to sensitive information whose declassification and release has not been authorized by requisite governmental
authority. Adopting and adhering to this pragmatic and balanced assessment
of government information access represents an intellectually credible and
professionally sound way for depository librarians to enter the new
millenium as exponents of a more informed citizenry.
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